Kevin A. McLeod v. Utah State Retirement Board : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
Kevin A. McLeod v. Utah State Retirement Board :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David B. Hansen; Howard, Phillips & Anderson; attorney for appellee.
Reed M. Richards, Brandon Richards; attorneys for appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, McLeod v. Retirement Board, No. 201000026 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2700
REED M. RICHARDS (#2746) 
BRANDON R. RICHARDS (#10254) 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-0550 
Fax:(801)334-9662 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KEVIN A. McLEOD, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal #: 201000026 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petition for Review from a Decision of the Utah State Retirement Board 
David B. Hansen 
HOWARD, PHILLIPS & ANDERSON 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Reed M. Richards 
Brandon Richards 
2564 Washington Blvd. Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT 
AUG 3 f 2010 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2,3 
ARGUMENT 3 
ISSUE I 
McLeocTs Interpretation of §49-11-504(9) is in Accordance with the Plain Language of the 
Statute and is not Superfluous 3 
ISSUE: II 
Public Policy Supports McLeod"s Interpretation of §42-1-504(9) 10 
ISSUE: III 
The Retirement Board is Equitably Estopped from Denying McLeod the Proper Calculation of 
His Retirement Benefit 14 
CONCLUSION 24 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bonhamv Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) 10 
Celebrity Club, Inc v Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) 14 
Grace Drilling Co v Bd of Review of Indus Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989)... 17 
Holland v Career Service Review Bd. 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993) 15,21 
Housekeeper v State, 2008 UT 78,1J18, 197P.3d636 18 
Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc v Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11, 228 P.3d 1242 15 
Schurtzv BMW of N Am, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991) 10 
State v Sorensen, 611 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980) 22 
Utah State Umv v Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982) 14 
West Jordan v Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982) 5 
2 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991) 18 
STATUTES 
§49-11-504(9) Utah Code Ann. (2009) 3,4,9, 10,12,14,24 
§49-11-103(2) Utah Code Ann (2002) 13 
§49-14-402(2)(a)UtahCodeAnn(2010) 7 
§49-23-304(2)(a)(2010) Utah Code Ann. (2010) 11 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
MCLEOD'S INTERPRETATION OF §49-11-504(9) IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND IS NOT SUPERFLUOUS 
Despite the glaring ambiguity that Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) (2000) presents 
and the numerous attempts to show that McLeod's interpretation of §49-11-504(9) is the 
correct interpretation of the statute, the Retirement Board continues to contend that the 
"plain language" of §49-11-504(9) UCA "clearly" states that (McLeod's) benefit should 
be calculated in two pieces based on the two service time periods. See Brief of Appellee 
at 13. In their brief, the Retirement Board also contends that finding otherwise would 
render the statute meaningless or superfluous. Id. The Retirement Board's interpretation 
of the statute makes little sense and seems to fly in the face of the plain language of the 
code. The statute states: 
(9)A retiree who has returned to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires 
shall have the retiree's allowance recalculated using: 
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all service credit 
accrued prior to that date; and 
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(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service credit 
accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates. 
The plain language of the statute requires the Retirement Board to use the proper formula 
to calculate retirement benefits for a retiree who has returned to employment. The 
Retirement Board is quite right that McLeod does not dispute their using the proper 
equation to calculate McLeod's benefit. What is in dispute is how7 that equation is to be 
solved and what percentage is to be included in that equation. The Retirement Board is 
emphatically incorrect when they bizarrely contend that any interpretation of §49-11-
504(9), other than their own, is "superfluous." 
The most plausible plain reading of the statute is that if someone retires from the 
system, collects retirement, returns to the system, and then retires again that the two 
service periods will be calculated by two different formulas: the one "in effect at the date 
of the retiree's original retirement" and the one "in effect at the date of the subsequent 
retirement." This does not mean that there are two separate benefits. It simply means that 
the formula used to calculate the retirement benefit will be the one in effect when the 
member retires, and if they retire multiple times, the correct formula is the one in effect at 
the time of each retirement. Clearly the legislature has an interest in making sure the 
calculation of retirement benefits is done based on the most current formula at the time a 
person retires. That is the purpose of the statute and that purpose is not meaningless or 
superfluous. As this past legislative session has shown, the legislature has a substantial 
interest in making sure that the formula used to calculate retirement benefits is based on 
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current economic conditions and within the budgetary guidelines of the Utah Retirement 
Board. 
"This Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to give 
effect to the Legislature's underlying intent." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 
446 (Utah 1982). Generally, the best indication of that intent is the statute's plain 
language. "Thus, we (the Court) will interpret a statute according to its plain language, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention if 
the express purpose of the statute. West Jordan at 446. 
McLeod's interpretation of the word 'formula' is, and always has been, the 
equation used to calculate a retiree's benefit, which varies depending on what percentage 
is used to calculate it. To conceptually understand McLeod's interpretation of the statute 
and why it does not render it meaningless, it is helpful to see how McLeod's plain 
reading of the statute effects his specific situation and the difference between his 
understanding of the statute and URS's interpretation. 
Public safety retirement benefits are calculated under a specific formula set by 
statute. The formula for the first 20 years of employment is two and one-half (2 14%) 
percent times 20. That number is then multiplied by the average of the top three earning 
years. For every year after 20 years, until 30, it is calculated the same, except the 
percentage is reduced to two percent (2%). 
Utah Retirement Systems Interpretation1 
1
 The salary amounts used are roughly similar to McLeod's actual salary. The figures are rounded off solely to 
demonstrate the differences of interpretations of the statute. See Hearing Transcript at 72:11 and 72:15 for specific 
amounts. 
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When McLeod retired for the first time in 1997 his average salary was roughly 
$50,000. His total term of service was also about 20 years. Again, the formula is the first 
20 years of employment multiplied by two and one-half (2*/2%) percent times 20. That 
number is then multiplied by the average of the top three earning years. 
The formula used to calculate his retirement is: (20 x 2 lA% ) x $50,000 
This equals $25,000.00 per year which is approximately what his retirement benefit was 
during the two year period McLeod retired from 1996-1998. 
URS then recalculates McLeod's benefit based on his next term of sendee, 
completely separate from the prior years of service. He came back into the retirement 
system in 1998 and retired in 2007. This would almost put his second term of service at 
ten years. Again, as mentioned above, the formula used to calculate this term of service is 
ten years multiplied by two percent (2%). This amount is then multiplied by the average 
of the top three earning years. 
Thus, the formula used, in McLeod's case, is (10 x 2%) x $85,000, equaling $17,500. 
Those two amounts ($25,000 + $17,500) are then added together to reach the entire 
allowed benefit ($42,500). 
McLeod's Interpretation 
McLeod's interpretation is much simpler, and much more in line with the wording 
of the statute. The equation is exactly the same. The first 20 years of employment 
multiplied by two and one-half (2Vi%) percent. That number is then multiplied by the 
average of the top three earning years. All subsequent years are calculated at two percent 
(2%). 
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Therefore, for the service period of 1976-1996 McLeod's retirement is calculated 
using the two and one half percent equation. When McLeod re-entered the system in 
1998 his retirement was then calculated using the two percent equation. Thus, McLeod 
retirement benefit ought to be calculated: 
20 (years) multiplied by 2 l/2% which is 50% 
10 (years) multiplied by 2% which is 15%. 
These two percentages added together is 65%. 65% is then multiplied by his highest three 
years of salary ($85,000) to get a total benefit of $59,500. McLeod's interpretation of the 
statute is clearly in accordance with the plain language of the statute. 
The Retirement Board further contends that "if you pay into a system for a few 
years, then begin drawing benefits from that system for a time without putting any 
additional money in, you will have less money (all other things being equal) than an 
individual who puts the same amount of money in an account, but does not draw on that 
money in the first place." Brief of Appellee at 18. This argument is nonsensical. Kevin 
McLeod worked for 28+ years in law enforcement before he started to collect his final 
retirement in 2007. He contributed exactly the same amount to his retirement benefit as 
anyone else that worked the same amount of time. McLeod5s entire objective in pursuing 
this case is that he be treated the same as anyone else that has worked his same amount of 
time. It is true that McLeod retired for roughly two years, from December of 1996 to 
January of 1999 and received his initial retirement benefit. Subsequently, he also lost two 
years toward the necessary thirty years to receive the maximum benefit. In order to get 
the maximum amount of benefits afforded to a peace officer, he would have to be 
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employed by a law enforcement agency for thirty7 years (in order to reach the maximum 
retirement allowed under U.C.A. §49-14-402(2)(a)). As mentioned above, in law 
enforcement, the formula for the first 20 years of employment is two and one-half (2 
lA%) percent times 20. That number is then multiplied by the average of the top three 
earning years. For every year after 20 years, until 30, it is calculated the same, except the 
percentage is reduced to two percent (2%). After 30 years of employment, law 
enforcement officers do not accrue additional retirement benefits. Therefore it makes 
sense to only remain employed for thirty years (even with gaps in terms of service) 
before an officer finally retires and begins to collect retirement. Because McLeod retired 
for two years from December 1996 to January 1999. he lost two years toward his thirty 
required years of service necessary for a maximum retirement benefit. He had to work 
an additional two years (from 2005-2007) to accrue the service years toward his 
maximum benefit. In those additional two years, he more than gave up in the amount he 
received in benefits those two years between his terms of service. He contributed to the 
system just as much as anyone else with his similar terms of service. All he asks is that he 
be treated the same as anyone else who has worked the same amount of time that he has. 
The Retirement Board's brief states that "Mr. McLeod's benefit that he received 
between December 1996 and January 1999 is worth $139,407.20 in today's dollars" and 
that "if Mr. McLeod is allowed to calculate his benefit as he desires, he will receive an 
approximate $140,000 windfall which he did not earn." See Appellee's Brief at 18. As 
mentioned above, during McLeod's first retirement period he received roughly $50,000 
2
 McLeod served 28 years 
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in his retirement benefit. The Retirement Board attaches ten percent (10%) interest to the 
received benefit and then arrives at $140,000. There is no deposit or savings account in 
the country that is returning ten percent in interest on a deposit. The fact that the 
Retirement Board imputes received benefits at ten percent interest seems to demonstrate 
their lack of good faith in calculating retirement benefits and in administering the various 
retirement systems to public employees. At best, McLeod's $50,000 benefit should be 
imputed with a three or four percent interest rate. Furthermore, as stated above, that 
amount is more than offset by having to work two additional years before receiving 
benefits. 
Finally, the Retirement Board incorrectly states McLeod's interpretation of §49-
11-504(9). Appellee's Brief states "He claims that 49-11-504(9) should be interpreted to 
mean that a post-retirement benefit will only be calculated in two pieces if the legislature 
happened to change the retirement formula between the first and second retirement 
dates." See Brief of Appellee at 19. McLeod never contended that retirement benefits 
need be calculated in two pieces, at least as far as this statute is concerned. In fact, 
Appellant's Brief clearly states "...to bifurcate the two terms of service is certainly not 
justified by the statute, and in fact, seems to be contrary to the clear language of the 
statute." See Brief of Appellant at 41. Again, the Retirement Board fails to grasp 
McLeod's interpretation and what seems to be the plain language of the statute. The 
statute does not mandate two periods of service for a retiree who has returned to work 
after retirement and starts to accrue additional service credit. If the Legislature meant two 
bifurcated time periods, then they would have so stated. All the statute says is that the 
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formula that is in effect at the date of the retiree's original and subsequent retirement 
dates will be added together to reach the proper percentage to calculate the final 
retirement benefit. 
ISSUE II 
PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS MCLEOD'S INTERPRETATION OF U.C.A. 49-
11-504(9) 
In an attempt to bolster their claim that URS properly interpreted the statute in 
issue here, URS mentioned several provisions in Title 49 to show that public policy 
considerations support their position. See Brief of Appellee at 17-18. Even if the Court 
does find ambiguity in the statute, public policy considerations support McLeod's 
interpretation of the statute. When faced with a question of statutory construction, Utah 
Courts first look first to the plain language of the statute. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) 
(per curiam). "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek 
guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations." Schurtz, 814 
P.2d at 1112; Bonham, 788 P.2d at 500. 
Retirement benefits of state employees were among the most "hot button" issues 
addressed in the 2010 legislative session. The formula, or equation, used to calculate 
retirement benefits was among the forefront of legislative issues. Senator Dan Liljenquist 
sponsored a number of bills aimed at fixing the entire system of public pensions. The rate 
of contribution for the public safety retirement system was changed during the 2010 
legislature session. This change directly effects the statute in controversy in the case at 
bar and demonstrates the purpose of the Legislature in passing this statute in the first 
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place. This past session the legislature completely revamped the public safety 
contribution plan, and changed the calculation of retirement benefits from 2.5% of the top 
three years of salary to 1.5% of the top five years5 salary. See U.C.A. §49-23-
304(2)(a)(2010). During the debate of Senate Bill 63 (the bill now codified as §49-23-
304), Senator Lilenquist stated that the purpose behind these bills was to "ensure that we 
can meet 100% of our pension obligations. To do that, we have to reduce the risk that our 
current system is bearing." The new law passed by the legislature and signed by 
Governor Herbert on March 29, 2010 reduces the contribution rate by the State of Utah to 
public safety retirees in order to pay off losses incurred by the Utah State Retirement 
Board during the 2008 financial crisis. As mentioned above the new law lowers the 
yearly contribution percentage from 2.5% to 1.5%. It also changed the formula in that it 
increased the number of years to calculate a retiree's average salary. Previously, as 
mentioned above, the formula to calculate retirement benefits is, for the first 20 years of 
employment, two and one-half (2 ¥2%) percent times 20. That number is then multiplied 
by the average of the top three earning years. For every year after 20 years, until 30, it is 
calculated the same, except the percentage is reduced to two percent (2%). SB 63 
increased the average of the top three earning years to five years. Therefore, as a result of 
SB 63, the formula will be, for the first 20 years of employment, one and one-half (1 
lA%) percent times 20. That number is then multiplied by the average of the top five 
earning years. There is no longer a 30 year stop date for accruing retirement benefits. The 
3
 See Senate Debate: SB 0063S01 at 12:01 
<http://le.utah.gov/jsp/jdisplay^ 
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period is indefinite. This new formula will significantly decrease the retirement benefit 
for a law enforcement retiree after 2011. 
The point of the changes instituted by this, and other retirement reforms, is as 
Senator Liljenquist mentioned, to make sure that the State can meet its financial 
obligations and to maintain the soundness of the various retirement systems. The 
"formula" mentioned in U.C.A. §49-11-504(9) is directly affected by the changes made 
to the public safety retirement system in the 2010 legislature. The formula was changed 
from a 2.5%) multiplier to a 1.5% multiplier, and the number of years used to calculate the 
average annual salary was increased from three to five years. This was all done in order 
to maintain the actuarial soundness of the system. For example, if a peace officer from a 
hypothetical Utah city police department retired in 2005 and started to collect retirement, 
his/her retirement would be calculated using the current 2.5%) multiplier. If he/she then 
decides to return to that police department after July 2011 (the effective date of §49-23-
304,) her benefit will be canceled and all service accrued after returning to work will be 
calculated using the new 1.5% multiplier. When this officer decides to retire again, 
his/her retirement should be calculated using the 2.5%) multiplier for all service accrued 
before 2005 and the 1.5% multiplier for all service accrued during her second term of 
service all multiplied by the average of the top five earning years, at least according the 
plain language of §49-11-504(9). Public policy dictates that the legislature has a direct 
interest in changing or altering the formula used to calculate retirement benefits. That is 
the purpose behind the statute at issue here. 
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The Legislature defined the purpose of Utah Retirement Board in Utah Code Ann. 
§49-11-103, as outlined in the Appellee's Brief on page 17. Subsection 2 states "This title 
shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and protections consistent with 
sound fiduciary and actuarial principles." Not only does this subsection mandate that 
Title 49 be construed liberally in favor of state employees who are members of the 
systems, but it also indicates that the Retirement Board has fiduciary duties toward state 
employees that are members of their retirement systems and to current retirees. Blacks 
Law Dictionary describes a fiduciary as "a person who is required to act for the benefit of 
another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to 
another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor." It further describes a 
fiduciary as "one who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another's money 
or property" Blacks Law Dictionary, 8 Edition 2004. As a fiduciary, URS had a 
heightened duty to be honest and exercise a high standard of care toward Kevin McLeod. 
They had a duty to inform him how they were going to calculate his retirement benefit 
and how decisions he made would impact that benefit. They especially had a duty to 
calculate his benefit properly and in accordance with statutory guidelines. Furthermore, 
as a fiduciary, it seems that URS ought to have a duty to keep track of members' phone 
calls. This could have been done by recording or by taking notes about what was said and 
noting which employee took the call, as is the practice with current system members. It 
seems that an agency that has a fiduciary duty to their members should be doing all of 
these things. 
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The purpose of Title 49 is more than met by McLeod's interpretation of §49-11-
504(9). Recent legislative history and actions taken by the legislature in reforming and 
creating new retirement systems for state employees indicate that an important concern of 
the legislature is protecting the financial soundness of the State. The intent of the 
legislature can be inferred by the plain language of §49-11-504(9) coupled with their 
recent actions to protect the financial soundness of the system. 
ISSUE III 
THE RETIREMENT BOARD IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED FROM DENYING 
MCLEOD THE PROPER CALCULATION OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFIT 
The Retirement Board continues to contend that McLeod has failed to prove that 
URS made a statement inconsistent with a claim later asserted to which he relied upon to 
his detriment, despite the clear evidence provided by McLeod in the hearing and in 
Appellant's Brief. 
As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel may not be asserted 
against the state and its agencies. Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 
(Utah 1982). Nevertheless, Utah courts have carved out an exception to this general 
common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain that the interests of justice 
so require." Id. at 720; see, e.g., Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comrn'n, 
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). "In cases where such an issue arises, the critical inquiry is 
whether it appears that the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice to be 
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Utah State Univ., 646 P.2d at 
720. Clearly, the finding of equitable estoppel against a government agency is a factual 
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inquiry and McLeod produced more than enough facts to satisfy a claim for equitable 
estoppel. 
The elements essential to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would 
result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd. 856 P. 2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 
1993). 
A. McLeod Provided Enough Evidence at the Hearing to Prove that 
URS Made a Statement to Him Which Was Later Repudiated. 
URS made a series of statements to McLeod that they later repudiated. It is clear 
that much of the information McLeod received from URS was received orally over a 
series of telephone calls. McLeod testified at the Hearing that he made over three phone 
calls to URS asking specific questions about his situation. See T. 15:9-25; 19:6-13; 25:2-
8. Neither URS, nor McLeod, took notes of these phone calls. Nevertheless, the 
statements can be inferred by the actions McLeod took in reliance upon them. 
i. McLeod properly marshaled the evidence to challenge the Hearing 
Officer's finding that URS never made a statement to McLeod. 
URS argues that "Mr. McLeod failed to properly marshal the evidence to correctly 
challenge the Hearing Officer's finding that URS never made a statement to Mr. McLeod 
which it later repudiated." In support of their argument, URS cited Friends of Maple 
Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11, ffiflO, 12, 228 P.3d 1242. It reads: 
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A recital of the trial court's findings with which the appellant disagrees does not 
amount to marshaling. Rather, the appellant must educate the court as to exactly 
how the trial court arrived at each of the challenged findings. This requires "a 
precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings," correlated 
to the location of that evidence in the record. Failure to provide this summary 
amounts to an invitation to the appellate court to invest its time and resources to 
"go behind the trial court's factual findings" itself; an invitation which the 
appellate court may, in its discretion, refuse. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, [^77, 
100 P.3d 1177. 
Therefore, appellants must first "present the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their 
case." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 
UT 35, % 26, 140 P.3d 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted). Then, appellants 
must "explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. 
Appellant's Brief clearly outlined the evidence produced at the hearing and explained 
why the Hearing Officer's application of the law to those facts was erroneous. 
Appellant's Brief outlined, and directly cited to, the facts as they were laid out in the 
hearing. In its brief, Appellant outlined that he had never received written confirmation of 
his conversations with URS. See Appellant's Brief at 17. He also outlined that he did not 
take notes of the phone calls he made. Id. These two facts were the primary reason why 
the Hearing Officer ruled that he could not find certainty that URS made any statement at 
all to McLeod about his retirement situation. The Memorandum Decision reads: 
In the instant case, there was no written communications from URS to the 
Petitioner before he retired. He relies on two telephone calls made to URS which 
were unfortunately not recorded in any manner by either URS or Petitioner. We 
have only his account of what questions he asked and what responses he 
received. We do not know who he talked to (name or position). A relatively brief 
telephone call may not always be adequate to explain an unusual fact or situation 
with enough detail to obtain an accurate answer. I have no doubt that the Petitioner 
came away from those calls with the understanding that he could retire, draw 
retirement, return in two years to the same office, retire later a second time and 
have his retirement benefit calculated on the basis of one period of employment. 
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But I cannot find that he was actually told that in either call. See 
Memorandum Decision at Page 2. 
McLeod fully satisfied the burden established by the Utah Supreme Court when it 
said that appellants must "present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court 
and not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case." United Park 
City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ]f 26, 140 P.3d 
1200. It certainly doesn't help Appellant's case that McLeod never received written 
communications from URS. In fact, as outlined above, the Hearing Officer used those 
particular facts to rule against the Petitioner at the hearing. Appellee's Brief further 
maintains that "McLeod failed to provide a 'precisely focused summary' of the evidence 
in the 'light most favorable' to the Hearing Officer's findings and failed to show any fatal 
flaws in the Hearing Officer's findings." See Appellee's Brief at 25. McLeod disagrees. 
All of the relevant evidence that the Hearing Officer used to arrive at his decision was 
included in the Appellant's Brief. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) state 
that "A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding." The Utah Supreme Court clarified the Rules that "to 
successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party 'must marshall [sic] all of 
the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence.'" Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm% 116 P.2d 
63,68(UtahCt.App.l989). 
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McLeod fully satisfied the marshaling requirement of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. All relevant evidence that the Hearing Officer, and thus the Board, 
used to arrive at their Findings of Fact was included, and cited to, in Appellant's Brief. 
Facts such as no written representations, no recording of phone calls, and no taking of 
notes during the alleged phone calls, which go to the heart of the decision by the Board to 
deny McLeod's petition, are properly included and "precisely summarized" in 
Appellant's Statement of Facts. See Brief of Appellant at 17. After outlining the facts, the 
Appellant attacked the reasoning of the Hearing Officer and "ferret(ed) out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) and argued why the Hearing Officer's application of the law to those facts 
was erroneous and asks this Court to review them for "clear error." Housekeeper v. State, 
2008 UT 78, f l8, 197 P.3d 636. McLeod is not asking this Court to retry the facts. Quite 
the contrary, McLeod is asking the court to review all relevant facts marshaled by the 
Appellant and to overrule the decision of the Hearing Officer and estopp the Utah 
Retirement Board from abrogating the promises made to McLeod in 1996. 
ii. The Hearing Record shows that URS made numerous statements to 
McLeod, which they later repudiated. 
Despite never requesting or receiving written declarations from the Retirement 
Office that his retirement would be calculated using one continuous period, the facts 
demonstrate that URS did in fact make statements to McLeod that it later repudiated. 
Claims for equitable estoppel "presents a mixed question, which 'involves the 
application of law to fact." Terry v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App 87, % 8, 157 P.3d 797 
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(quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 33 n. 12, 70 P.3d 111.) The court reviews the 
underlying facts for clear error and the application of the law to those facts for 
correctness. See Id. 
URS recites portions of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact in an effort to prove 
that URS has no record of telephone calls between McLeod and URS in 1996. See Brief 
of Appellee at 28. Clearly neither side has physical documents proving the substance of 
these phone calls. Also, it is important to note that Utah courts have never held that there 
must be written representations to prevail on an estoppel claim against a government 
entity. Presumably, since it has never held as such, oral declarations can be used as 
evidence of an estoppel claim. McLeod emphatically renews his assertion that he called 
URS on three separate occasions between 1996-1999 and was told that his retirement 
would be calculated as one continuous term of service, and not two bifurcated terms. 
Both times he made contact with URS in 1996 the operator indicated that his service 
would be calculated as one continuous term. 
McLeod also received statements from Utah Retirement Systems that showed his 
benefit calculated as one continuous period. Although he received these statements after 
he retired from the Davis County Sherriff s Office, it further demonstrates and adds 
credibility to his claims that he was told his retirement would be calculated as one 
continuous period, not two as the Retirement Board is now claiming. These statements 
are not ambiguous. The statements plainly show one continuous term of service from the 
time McLeod began working at the Bountiful Police Department in 1976 to when he 
finally retired from the Davis County Sherriff s Office in 2007. These statements, albeit 
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received after McLeod first retired in 1996, add a lot of weight to McLeod's claim that he 
received information from the Retirement Board that his retirement benefit would be 
based on one period of service. Furthermore, these statements are prepared by URS 
employees and it is presumable, probably likely, that URS employees would look at these 
statements and assume that retirement benefits are calculated as one continuous time-
period. These statements clearly denote one time period as the basis for calculating 
retirement benefits for a retiree who has returned to work. It is highly likely that an 
employee, looking at these statements, would conclude that the time of service would be 
calculated as one continuous benefit. 
Because of the assured attitude of the retirement officer that he talked to, McLeod 
left the Davis County Sheriffs Office with a high level of comfort that his retirement 
would not be adversely affected. Unfortunately, we do not know who he talked to in the 
office. URS continues to maintain that all calls regarding post retirement would have 
been answered by Judy Lund: "Any phone calls regarding post-retirement retirement 
calculation questions, like the ones Mr. McLeod alleged he asked, would have been 
transferred to her." See Brief of Appellee at 29. This assertion is directly contradicted by 
Ms. Lund herself when she testified that phone calls generally first go to the Customer 
Service Department and then to someone who can properly answer the question. 
Presumably, questions about post retirement benefits would have gone to her, if she were 
available to take the call. However, if Ms. Lund was unavailable backs-ups or specialists 
in other areas attempted to answer the questions. See Appellant's Brief at 20 or the 
Hearing Transcript 153:3-7; 154: 8-21. It is not difficult to realize that Ms. Lund was not 
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available 100% of the time to answer questions. Due to the number of employees in the 
office and the large amount of turnover in the past 13 years we will probably never know 
who McLeod talked to. It is also entirely possible that the person he talked to no longer 
remember the conversation, is not willing to divulge exactly what was said, or no longer 
works forURS. 
Nevertheless, we can be assured that those comments were made, not only because 
of McLeod5 s recollection, but also because he immediately, after having those two 
conversations with the Retirement Office, talked in detail with Sheriff Cox and with his 
wife, Diane McLeod. He relayed to both of them exactly what he was told: that upon his 
return to work his retirement would not be adversely affected except that he would lose 
the two years of service when he was gone, and that the benefit would be canceled until 
he finally retired. By his actions and the testimony of people surrounding him at the time, 
confirmed by the statements he received in the mail, the first three prongs of estoppel are 
met: a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the 
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act. Holland at 682. The third prong 
"injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act" is met when the Board denied 
all of McLeod 5s direct appeals. 
iii. The oral statements URS made to McLeod are not hearsay under the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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The Retirement Board asserts that the Hearing Officer "could not make a finding 
that URS made an oral disputed statement to Mr. McLeod which it later repudiated 
because such a finding of fact would be based solely on inadmissible hearsay "Brief of 
Appellee at 31 The Board has failed to properly describe and apply the hearsay rule. The 
hearsay rule does not ban all out of court statements being admitted into evidence; only 
that it not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Utah Rules of Evidence 801(c) 
defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If an out 
of court statement is introduced for any purpose other than to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted, there is no need to cross examine the declarant; so the statement is not 
hearsay. Specifically, statements offered to show their effect on the hearer and statements 
offered as circumstantial evidence of declarant's state of mind are not covered under the 
hearsay rule. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "when an out-of-court statement is 
offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, such 
testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule." State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333, 337 
(Utah 1980) McLeod is not offering the oral statements made by URS to him for the truth 
of the matter asserted but in order to show the motive behind his decision to retire and in 
an effort to explain why he took the actions he did. Because the oral statements are not 
hearsay, they are admissible and available to be used as a basis for a finding of fact in an 
administrative hearing. Again, the Board misunderstands the hearsay rule when they state 
"If Mr. McLeod claims that his testimony is not necessarily true regarding the 
conversations with URS, he once again has no evidence for the substance of these 
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conversations." It makes no difference whether or not the information McLeod received 
from URS was true or not. A URS employee told McLeod that his retirement would be 
calculated as one continuous period, not bifurcated based on two separate terms of 
service. McLeod relied on those statements when he made the decision to retire. It 
matters not that the information given to him was true. The mere fact that the statements 
were made is what is at issue. Because the statements were offered to show why McLeod 
made the retirement decisions that he did, and not for the actual truth of those statements, 
they are not covered under the Hearsay Rule and may be used as the sole basis for a 
ruling by an administrative law judge. 
The Hearing Officer erred when he ruled that McLeod did not meet all of the 
elements of estoppel. Kevin McLeod would have received his full retirement benefit if 
accurate advice had been given to him. He would have either not retired when he left for 
the two years, not left at all, waited another year to return until the law changed and 
allowed him to place his future retirement in a retirement fund 401(k) and collect his 
retirement during the full term that he served as Chief Deputy at the Davis County 
Sheriffs Office. The year after McLeod first retired in 1996 the law was changed so that 
members could opt to have their retirement placed in a 401(k) retirement plan. Ever since 
then, retiree's who are temporarily retiring, either to take a job in the private sector (like 
McLeod did) or for any other purpose, can place their retirement into a 401(k). If 
McLeod would have had that option available to him, he may have taken it. All of these 
options would have allowed him to receive the full benefit of his retirement. The only 
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limited area where the Retirement Office has taken the position that he cannot receive his 
retirement is to do exactly what he did, based on their advice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Retirement Board did not interpret Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) accurately. 
A proper interpretation of the statute is that the formula that is in effect at the date of the 
retiree's original and subsequent retirement dates will be added together to reach the 
proper percentage to calculate the final retirement benefit. The Retirement Board is 
reading language into the statute that is not there: that the terms of service are bifurcated 
and added together rather than one continuous fluid period. 
Additionally, McLeod has shown that Hearing Officer erred when it determined 
that he had not met all of the elements required to invoke estoppel against the Utah 
Retirement Board. URS made statements to McLeod in a series of phone calls from 
1996-1999. They then repudiated those statements when McLeod called for a fourth time 
to clarify what had be previously told to him in 2001, after McLeod had relied on their 
information. McLeod will lose hundreds of thousands of dollars over his lifetime because 
of the mistake of the Retirement Board. This is more than enough to satisfy the standards 
of equitable estoppel against URS. This grave injustice cannot be allowed to stand and 
the Court ought to invoke estoppel against the Utah Retirement Board. 
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